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A CHANGE IN THE DYNAMICS OF THE DECISION PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract

With the acceptance of the European Constitution, decision procedures will be modified and the division of authority among its institutions will be altered. The new rules that guide the decision procedure in the European Union will be given by Art. III-396 of the European Constitution. By comparing article III-396 of the European Constitution with the most frequently used Art. 251 ECT of the treaty of the European Community, we will be able to discover significant differences that the European Constitution brings to the decision procedure. Using the exact same method as Kolmar applied on Art. 250-252 of the Treaty of Amsterdam in “An Analysis of Institutional Change in the European Union” (2003) we have been able to attain information on what are the decisive actors in the different decision procedures, how the tendencies for centralization are inherent in the different decision procedures and what each decision procedure’s ability is to guarantee conflict minimizing compromises between the institutional actors. We show that when the European Parliament has few possibilities to amend, both the European Parliament as the European Commission has less real authority under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution, and that the role of “most decisive institutional actor” shifts from the European Parliament to the Council of Ministers. When the European Parliament has more possibilities to amend, we detect a difference in the equilibrium of the decision procedure, but no difference in the dynamics of the decision procedure.

Keywords: European Constitution, Law and economics, Game theory, Institutional actors, Decision procedure, Authority.

JEL classification: D72, D78, H70.

Introduction

The draft of the European constitution was passed on the 18th of June in 2004 after a period of discussion and modification. With the formal signing on the 29th of October by the leaders of the member states the ratification period now will start. With the acceptance of the European Constitution by the Members of the European Union all old European treaties will expire. Among the many new laws that the European Constitution brings, there will be changes in the decision procedures as well as in the authority of its institutions. In this analysis we will try to answer the following question: "What are the consequences of the introduction of article III-396 of the European constitution on the dynamics of the decision procedure compared to the decision procedure under the old article 251 ECT of the European Community Treaty?" The problem will be divided into smaller questions, leading to an answer on the main question stated above:

- What is the difference between the decision procedure under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution and the old, most frequently used, decision procedure under Art. 251 ECT from a game-theoretical approach?
- What is the game-theoretical equilibrium of the decision procedure under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution, and what is the difference in the game-theoretical equilibrium in comparison to the decision-procedure under Art. 251 ECT?
- What are the changes in the dynamics of the legislative process under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution in comparison to dynamics of the legislative process under Art. 251 ECT? By analyzing this, we should be able to find the change in tendency in favor of centralization", "most decisive institutional actor" and "the deviation of each institutional actors preference".

In this analysis we will use the exact same method that Kolmar applied in "An Analysis of Institutional Change in the European Union" (2003). Kolmar used this method to analyze and compare the equilibriums of the decision procedures under the different articles, 250ECT, 251 ECT and 252 ECT given by the old treaty of the European Community. What makes our analysis relevant is that Kolmar's method is an excellent guide to compare the new article III-396 of European constitution to the old article 251 ECT of the treaty of the European Community. The comparison to Art. 251 ECT is chosen because this article is very successful in practice. It has proven to be successful in accommodating the different interests that have a stake

in the legislative process,¹ and the fact that the Art. 251 ECT procedure applies to most EC legislation.² The results of the analysis will expose the changes that the European Constitution brings to the decision procedure, the authority of the institutional actors and its dynamics.

Legal framework

The old decision making procedure is described as earlier stated in Art. 251 ECT. The procedure starts with a proposal by the European Commission (EC), which the European Parliament (EP) can either accept or modify. When it is accepted the Council of Ministers (CM) can either accept it or reject it. When the EP has amendments on the original proposal the CM can accept this or give its own common position. The difference between an amendment and a position is that in the amendment case the EP is able to alter the proposal, while in the position case it is only allowed to give its dis- or approval. This position will be discussed by the EP, which has now three possibilities. First is to accept it, second to reject it or at last come up with additional amendments. The amendments will go to the EC. They can either accept or reject these amendments and in both cases the CM is the next step. With an accepted amendment the CM is able to accept this with qualified majority, while if the amendments were rejected the CM can only approve them by unanimity. There is a qualified majority when at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing 65% of the population of the Union vote for or against.³ Under Art. 251 ECT qualified majority would mean a 62 of the total 87 votes.⁴ When the CM rejects the proposal, it will be handed to the mediation committee. The mediation committee, consisting of an equal number of members of the EP as of the CM, will undergo a bargaining process until they have constructed a new proposal. Both the EP and the CM have after this still the possibility to accept or reject the proposal.

With the arrival of the European constitution this decision making procedure was altered in Art. III-396. This procedure is mainly the same, though there are a few slight changes. After the original proposal of the EC, the EP is now only allowed to give its position. The CM can now accept this from the EP or come up with its own common position. These differences have as result that in stage (II) the EP can only come up with a position, the first rejection can now only take

1 Dashwood, A. (1994). Community Legislative Procedures in the Era of the TEU, *E. L. Rev.*, 19, 343.

2 Craig, P. C. (1998) Harlow (eds), Lawmaking in the European Union (Kluwer).

3 Art. I-25.

4 Art. 23 ECT.

place in the second reading and the total possibilities of acceptation or rejection are decreased from six to five.

Game theoretical analysis of the decision procedure under Art. 251 ECT (Kolmar, 2003)

Game theory will make it possible to analyze the decision procedures and the changes brought forth by the introduction of the European Constitution. The game theory is a method to predict what strategic choices/moves rational players will make in a game. When the game is portrayed in an extensive form, actions and reaction of the relevant rational players can be predicted. The extensive form of a game can be presented in a scheme. The equilibrium of the game (in our case the game is the decision procedure) can be found through backward induction. In this “Nash-equilibrium” the players make their best strategic move, bearing in mind the strategic actions and reactions of the other players. Because of this, the players will not alter their behaviour and stop looking for alternative strategies.⁵ The players in the game will be the institutional actors consisting of the EC, EP and CM.

In this analysis we assume that the necessary quorum to pass a decision is irrelevant for the outcome of the game. It is also important to bear in mind that by “authority” we mean real authority, as there is difference between formal and real authority. According to Aghion and Triole (1997); an actor has *formal authority* if there is at least one stage of the game in extensive form where this player can make a choice, an actor has *real authority* if he has formal authority and his choice of action can have an influence on the outcome of the game.

To transform the decision procedure into a game in extensive form, certain notations will be used.⁶ Strategies will be denoted by “S”, and the decision that sprouts from this strategy will be denoted by “P”. For example, the European Commission starts the game by making a proposal with strategy (S_i) or by refraining from making a proposal, thus choosing the status quo (P_{sq}). Amendments are denoted by “a” and “points of view” are denoted by “p”. When the European Parliament amends the proposal of the European Commission, strategy (S_i) evolves into (S_{ia}). When the European Parliament is only able to give its position on the European Commission’s initial proposal, strategy (S_i) changes into (S_{ip}). When a proposal is chosen in accordance to a certain strategy, the strategy (e.g. S_{ip}) changes into decision (P_{ip}). With these notations the decision procedure looks like

5 Pindyck, Robert. S., Rubinfeld, Daniel. L. (2001) *Microeconomics*. Prentice Hall International, Inc. p.433.

6 Notations will be the same as used in Kolmar (2003).

the schemes presented in Figures 1 and 2.

The equilibrium of a game depends on the amount of permissible amendments on the initial proposal of the Commission.⁷ In case there are few possibilities to amend, finding the equilibrium is relatively straight forward. The Parliament as well as the Council are able to approve or reject a proposal of the Commission. Because both institutions posses the power to reject a proposal, the Commission will maximize its utility function by taking into account the utility functions of the Parliament and the Council. The equilibrium strategy of the game in extensive form under article 251 ECT will be characterized by the following maximization problem.⁸

$$\begin{aligned} P = \arg \max_P uEC(P) \text{ s.t. } & uCM(P) \geq uCM(Psq) \\ & \wedge uEP(P) \geq uEP(Psq) \end{aligned}$$

This function describes the decision for which the utility function of the Commission is maximized, given that when the decision is made, the utility for the Parliament as well as for the Council is greater than the status-quo. More possibilities to amend mean that the Parliament and the Council can choose from several alternative options in each stage of the game. The scheme shows that the decision procedure according to Art. 251 ECT contains nine stages. The strategy of the Commission in the fifth stage (V) has no influence on the rest of the game, both strategies lead to the same continuation of the game.⁹ In stage (IX) the CM is able to block any decision that does not exceed the utility level of the status-quo. The same applies to the Parliament in stage (VIII). Only decisions that satisfy

$$uEP(P) - uEP(Psq) \geq 0, uCM(P) - uCM(Psq) \geq 0 \quad (1)$$

will pass through stage (VIII) and stage (IX). The mediation commission in stage (VII) consists of an equal number of members from the Parliament as of members from the Council. Their objective is to negotiate until they reach a compromise between the institutions. The welfare resulting from this agreement is

⁷ Kolmar, Martin. (2003). An analysis of institutional change in the European Union. *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 16, 309.

⁸ Ibid. p.314.

⁹ Ibid. p.318.





Fig. 2 Art. III-396



$$uEP(P) - uEP(Psq), uCM(P) - uCM(Psq) \quad (2)$$

The Nash-bargaining function of the agreement can be described as:

$$Piapap = \arg \max_{P \in P} f(uEP(P) - uEP(Psq), uCM(P) - uCM(Psq)) \quad (3)$$

Arising from the fact that this is a Nash-bargaining function, the outcome automatically implies that the outcome will be pareto optimal with a unique solution, individuals are rational (utility maximizing), their threats are credible and players have a mutual interest in reaching an agreement.¹⁰ This causes the Council to only accept *Piapain* stage (VI) when the utility level is higher than the utility level of *Piapap*. Because the European Commission's strategy in stage (V) does not influence the outcome of the game,¹¹ it is possible to jump from stage (VI) to stage (IV). In stage (IV) the Parliament can accept the proposal from the Council (*Piap*) or it can amend the proposal (*Piapa*). The utility level of the Council for *Piapa* cannot be lower than its utility level for *Piapap*. The Parliament will therefore fulfill the utility function:

$$\max_P uEP(P) \text{ s.t. } uCM(P) \geq uCM(Piapap) \quad (4)$$

The Council has a similar position in stage (III). The council can accept the proposal that has been amended by the Parliament in stage (II), or give its position on the amended proposal (*Piap*). This strategy will only prove to be successful if the Parliament has at least a utility level of $uEP(Piapap)$, otherwise the Parliament will amend the decision in stage (IV) and it will end up at the mediation commission in stage (VII). Therefore, the Council will fulfill the utility function in stage (III) of:

$$\max_P uCM(P) \text{ s.t. } uEP(P) \geq uEP(Piapap) \quad (5)$$

10 Laurentian University, Department of economics. The Nash solution for a bargaining game, downloaded. 2nd October 2004, from http://www.economics.laurentian.ca/Strategic_Think.27/Modules/Course_Schedule.98/Bargaining/Nash%20solution/nash_solution.htm.

11 Kolmar, Martin. (2003). An analysis of institutional change in the European Union. *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 16, 318.

The Parliament's strategy in stage (II) has no consequence on the rest of the game. The Council is guaranteed to have a utility level of $uCM(Piapp)$, regardless of what the Parliament chooses to do. The outcome of the sub-game in stage (II) is determined by the outcome of the mediation game in stage (VII). The Commission will keep this in mind when it makes its proposal in stage (I). The European Commission will therefore only make a proposal when

$$uEC(Piapp) \geq uEC(Psq) \quad (6)$$

The equilibrium of a game in extensive form with many possibilities to amend is characterized as followed:

$$\begin{aligned} P = \arg \max_P f(uEP(P) - uEP(Psq), uCM(P) - uCM(Psq), \\ \text{if } uEC(Piapp) \geq uEC(Psq) \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Psq , when it does not fulfill the utility function above.

When there are few possibilities to amend, nothing changes in the equilibrium strategy in comparison to Art. 251 ECT. Every institutional actor takes the strategies of the other institutional actors into account in the same way. Therefore, there are no differences in the utility maximizations. When there are more possibilities to amend, there is a difference in stage (II). The difference is that the Parliament is only allowed to give its position according to Art. III-396 of the European Constitution, instead of having the option to amend a proposal. The strategy that was *sia* under Art. 251 ECT will change to *Si* under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution in stage (II). The Council has to react to this strategy, and from that point on the game will be the same as it was according to Art. 251 ECT. With more possibilities to amend the game is characterized by the utility function:

$$\begin{aligned} P = \arg \max_P f(uEP(P) - uEP(Psq), uCM(P) - uCM(Psq), \\ \text{if } uEC(Pipp) \geq uEC(Psq) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Psq , when it does not fulfill the utility function above.

Dynamic Analysis

The dynamic analysis of art.251 ECT and art.III-396 of the European Constitution can be performed with the usage of the derived equilibriums. To perform the analysis three theoretical decision possibilities will be given from which the three players are able to choose.¹² These decision possibilities are: centralization, partial centralization and decentralization ($P=(c,p,d)$). Decentralization will be the status-quo. Centralization is when political authority is transferred from a national to the European level. Decentralization means that governing authority is held at a national level. Partial decentralization is when governing authority is set at a national level but is centrally coordinated. The dynamic analysis can give perspective to three important issues which are: “tendency to centralize political authority”, “most decisive player” and “deviation of preferences”. The “tendency to centralize political authority” can be measured for the two decision procedures. Assuming that the theoretical preferences represent the true preference of the three players, there would be two ways to find the tendency to centralize political authority. One can predict the most probable preference structure of each institution, and can henceforth find the equilibrium of the decision procedure. The second option is to measure the rank of centralization by counting the permutations of the preference structures where centralization, partial centralization or decentralization is the equilibrium. In order to find the permutations of the preferences, the preference structure of the Commission will be fixed. The reason for fixing the preference structure of the Commission shall be given using an example. When there are two players in a decision procedure with options *a* and *b*, there are four possible preference structures (*a,a*), (*a,b*), (*b,a*), (*b,b*). The first two and the second two preference structures are inversely symmetrical to each other. This creates a “free degree” within the amount of possible preference structure variations. By fixing the preferences of one of the institutions, the four relevant preference structures can be reduced to two. In a case where there are three institutions in the decision procedure, the fixation of the preferences of one of the institutions, will reduce the amount of permutations from 112 to 36.¹³

When the preference structure of the European Commission is used as the “control”, the 36 variation in the preference structures of the European Parliament and the Council can be noted. All the 36 permutations of preference structures are given in table 1. With every permutation of the preference structure the equilibrium of the decision procedure under Art. 251 ECT and Art. III-396 of the European constitution can be found. The degree with which the true preference differs from

12 Ibid. p.314

13 Ibid. p.315

centralization is found by counting the amount of permutations from centralization. When the equilibrium for each permutation of preference order has been found, the player that has its preference equal to the final decision most often can be detected. This will be “the most decisive institutional actor”. Finally, the deviations of the preferences of each player can be measured. When the final decision corresponds to the most preferred option of one of the players “0” will be added to the “measurement”. When the final decision is a player’s second choice, “1” will be added to the measurement, and when the final decision is a player’s third choice, “2” will be added to the “measurement”. The “measurement” is spread over a scale from 0 to 6. An outcome of 0 means that the final outcome is equal to the most preferred option of all the institutional actors. 6 describes a situation where all players have the same preference order and the final decision is the complete opposite ordering of the preferences. This measurement can give an idea of the decision procedure’s ability is to guarantee conflict-minimizing compromises between the institutional actors. The measurements¹⁴ of the deviations are shown in table 3.

With the help of the data from table 1 it is possible to find the equilibrium outcomes for each permutation in preference structures. To clarify the process, an example shall be given for a case where there are few possibilities to amend, and a case where there are more possibilities to amend. Assuming there are few possibilities to amend and the European Commission has the preference structure of c,p,d, the Council p,c,d and the Parliament c,p,d (permutation 6), the commission will propose c under Art. 251 ECT. Looking at the preference structure we see that the Parliament will agree with proposal c. The Council will have to choose between rejecting the proposal, leading to an outcome of d (status-quo), or passing proposal c. Taking into account the Council’s preference structure, we see that it will still choose proposal c, leading to the equilibrium outcome c. Under Art. III-396 the Commission will propose c and the Parliament will agree with c. In stage (III) the Council has the choice between accepting the proposal or choosing p. The Council will choose p because it knows that in stage (IV) the Parliament only has a choice between rejecting this position d or accepting it p. The equilibrium outcome will be p. In this lies the implicit assumption that the Council is able to propose a new alternative when it gives its common position,¹⁴ and that the Parliament is only able to dis- or approve when giving its position. When there are more possibilities to amend and the European Commission has the preference structure c,p,d, the Council p,c,d and the Parliament c,p,d the outcome will be the following; because the Council and the Parliament will accept c as well as p in stage (VIII) and (IX), the outcome will depend on the proposal of the Mediation Commission. As the negotiation mechanism of the mediation commission is not treated in this analysis

14 This assumption is in line with the method used by Kolmar (2003).

we assume the outcome of the game is (c,p). The equilibrium for every permutation of preference structures is presented in table 2.

Results of the Dynamic Analysis

In table 1 b and 1 c it is shown that when there are few possibilities to amend, there is a difference in the equilibrium between the decision procedure under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution and under Art. 251 ECT (in the equilibrium analysis there were no changes present). With the decision procedure under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution there has been a rise in the tendency to centralize and decentralize in comparison to the decision procedure under article 251 ECT (see table 2). The sum of the rise in centralization and the rise in decentralization is equal to the decline in partial decentralization. The results of table 3 prove that there are no changes in the aggregated average deviation, it is only the distribution of c,p and d among the institutional actors that have been altered. The average deviation has risen for the Commission as well as for the Parliament. These increases in the average deviation combined are equal to the decrease in average deviation for the Council. When there are more opportunities to amend there is no detectable difference in the equilibrium outcomes presented in table 2 or the deviations of the institution's preferences presented in table 3. From this analysis the conclusion can be drawn that when there are few possibilities to amend for the Parliament, the European Constitution will create a larger tendency towards centralization and decentralization, and that in comparison to the equilibrium of the decision procedure according to Art. 251 ECT there is a larger gap between the preference and the final decision for the Commission and the Parliament, while the deviation between the preference of the Council and the final decision shrinks. The most decisive institution is the Parliament under either Art. 251 ECT or Art. III-396 of the European Constitution if there are more possibilities to amend. When there are few possibilities to amend, the most decisive institution is the Parliament under Art. 251 ECT and the Council under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution.

Conclusion

The European Constitution brings changes in the decision procedure as well as changes in the authorities of the relevant institutional actors. By comparing the decision procedure under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution with the most frequently used decision procedure under the Treaty of the European Union, article 251 ECT, the changes have become apparent. The large difference lies in the first lecture of the decision procedure, where under Art. 251 ECT, the Parliament has the

right to amend a proposal whilst under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution the European Parliament can only give its position on the proposal. Through a game theoretical approach it has been possible to find an equilibrium for both decision procedures. When there are few possibilities to amend there are no differences in either the equilibrium under Art. 251 ECT or under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution. When there are more possibilities to amend the equilibria differ. This difference is created by the European Parliament's authority-shift from being able to amend to solely giving a position in stage (II), generating a final decision of *Pippap*, instead of *Piapap*. With the discovery of these equilibria it has been possible to study the dynamics of the decision procedures. While the equilibrium in the case where there are few possibilities to amend has not changed, the dynamics in this case has. The analysis of the dynamics show that when there are few possibilities to amend, both the Parliament and the Commission have less authority under Art. III-396 of the European Constitution in comparison to the decision procedure under Art. 251 ECT, and that the most decisive institution shifts from the Parliament to the Council. Because the European Parliament most strongly represent the citizens of the European Union, the results of the analysis makes one wonder why the authority of the European Parliament is not intensified with the acceptance of the European Constitution. It seems that political authority shifts to a National level, where the Council has the strongest position within the decision procedure.

Table 1: Preferences of the Institutions

perm.	Commission			Council of Ministers			Parliament		
	best	mid	worst	best	mid	worst	best	mid	worst
1	c	p	d	c	p	d	c	p	d
2	c	p	d	c	d	p	c	p	d
3	c	p	d	d	c	p	c	p	d
4	c	p	d	d	p	c	c	p	d
5	c	p	d	p	d	c	c	p	d
6	c	p	d	p	c	d	c	p	d
7	c	p	d	c	p	d	c	d	p
8	c	p	d	c	d	p	c	d	p
9	c	p	d	d	c	p	c	d	p
10	c	p	d	d	p	c	c	d	p
11	c	p	d	p	d	c	c	d	p
12	c	p	d	p	c	d	c	d	p
13	c	p	d	c	p	d	d	c	p
14	c	p	d	c	d	p	d	c	p
15	c	p	d	d	c	p	d	c	p
16	c	p	d	d	p	c	d	c	p
17	c	p	d	p	d	c	d	c	p
18	c	p	d	p	c	d	d	c	p
19	c	p	d	c	p	d	d	p	c
20	c	p	d	c	d	p	d	p	c
21	c	p	d	d	c	p	d	p	c
22	c	p	d	d	p	c	d	p	c
23	c	p	d	p	d	c	d	p	c
24	c	p	d	p	c	d	d	p	c
25	c	p	d	c	p	d	p	d	c
26	c	p	d	c	d	p	p	d	c
27	c	p	d	d	c	p	p	d	c
28	c	p	d	d	p	c	p	d	c
29	c	p	d	p	d	c	p	d	c
30	c	p	d	p	c	d	p	d	c
31	c	p	d	c	p	d	p	c	d
32	c	p	d	c	d	p	p	c	d
33	c	p	d	d	c	p	p	c	d
34	c	p	d	d	p	c	p	c	d
35	c	p	d	p	d	c	p	c	d
36	c	p	d	p	c	d	p	c	d

Table 2: Equilibrium Outcomes

permutation	251		III-396	
	no amendments	amendments	no amendments	amendments
1	c	c	c	c
2	c	c	c	c
3	d	d	d	d
4	d	d	d	d
5	p	p	p	p
6	c	{c, p}	p	{c, p}
7	c	c	c	c
8	c	c	c	c
9	d	d	d	d
10	d	d	d	d
11	p	{c, p}	d	{c, p}
12	c	c	c	c
13	d	d	d	d
14	d	d	d	d
15	d	d	d	d
16	d	d	d	d
17	d	d	d	d
18	d	d	d	d
19	d	d	d	d
20	d	d	d	d
21	d	d	d	d
22	d	d	d	d
23	d	d	d	d
24	d	d	d	d
25	p	p	p	p
26	p	p	d	p
27	d	d	d	d
28	d	d	d	d
29	p	p	p	p
30	p	p	p	p
31	p	{c, p}	c	{c, p}
32	p	c	c	c
33	d	d	d	d
34	d	d	d	d
35	p	p	p	p

continue Table 2

permutation	251		III-396	
	no amendments	amendments	no amendments	amendments
36	p	p	p	p
#c	6	{9, 6}	7	{9, 6}
#p	10	{7, 10}	7	{7, 10}
#d	20	{20, 20}	22	{20, 20}

Table 3: Deviations of Equilibrium from Preferences

251						
permu.	no amendments			with amendments		
	EC	CM	EP	EC	CM	EP
1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	2	0	2	2	0	2
4	2	0	2	2	0	2
5	1	0	1	1	0	1
6	0	1	1	{0, 1}	{1, 0}	{1, 1}
7	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	2	0	1	2	0	1
10	2	0	1	2	0	1
11	1	0	2	{0, 1}	{2, 0}	{0, 2}
12	0	1	0	0	1	0
13	2	2	0	2	2	0
14	2	1	0	2	1	0
15	2	0	0	2	0	0
16	2	0	0	2	0	0
17	2	1	0	2	1	0
18	2	2	0	2	2	0
19	2	2	0	2	2	0
20	2	1	0	2	1	0
21	2	0	0	2	0	0
22	2	0	0	2	0	0

*continue Table 3***251**

permu.	no amendments			with amendments		
	EC	CM	EP	EC	CM	EP
23	2	1	0	2	1	0
24	2	2	0	2	2	0
25	1	1	0	1	1	0
26	1	2	0	1	2	0
27	2	0	1	2	1	0
28	2	0	1	2	0	1
29	1	0	0	1	0	0
30	1	0	0	1	0	0
31	1	1	0	{0, 1}	{0, 1}	{1, 0}
32	1	2	0	0	0	1
33	2	0	2	2	0	2
34	2	0	2	2	0	2
35	1	0	1	1	0	0
36	1	0	1	1	0	0
Dev.	50	20	16	{47, 50}	{20, 18}	{15, 18}
Av. dev.	1,39	0,55	0,44	{1,3, 1,39}	{0,55, 0,5}	{0,41, 0,5}
Aggreg.	2,38			{2,26, 2,39}		

III-396

permu.	no amendments			with amendments		
	EC	CM	EP	EC	CM	EP
1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	2	0	2	2	0	2
4	2	0	2	2	0	2
5	1	0	1	1	0	1
6	1	0	1	{0, 1}	{1, 0}	{1, 1}
7	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	2	0	1	2	0	1
10	2	0	1	2	0	1
11	2	1	1	{0, 1}	{2, 0}	{0, 2}
12	0	1	0	0	1	0
13	2	2	0	2	2	0
14	2	1	0	2	1	0

continue Table 3

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permu.	no amendments			with amendments		
	EC	CM	EP	EC	CM	EP
15	2	0	0	2	0	0
16	2	0	0	2	0	0
17	2	1	0	2	1	0
18	2	2	0	2	2	0
19	2	2	0	2	2	0
20	2	1	0	2	1	0
21	2	0	0	2	0	0
22	2	0	0	2	0	0
23	2	1	0	2	1	0
24	2	2	0	2	2	0
25	1	1	0	1	1	0
26	2	1	1	1	2	0
27	2	0	1	2	1	0
28	2	0	1	2	0	1
29	1	0	0	1	0	0
30	1	0	0	1	0	0
31	0	0	1	{0, 1}	{0, 1}	{1, 0}
32	0	0	1	0	0	1
33	2	0	2	2	0	2
34	2	0	2	2	0	2
35	1	0	0	1	0	0
36	1	0	0	1	0	0
Dev.	52	16	18	{47, 50}	{20, 18}	{15, 18}
Av. dev.	1.44	0.44	0.5	{1.3, 1.39}	{0.55, 0.5}	{0.41, 0.5}
Aggreg.	2.38			{2.26, 2.39}		

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